I. Introduction
This paper presents and tests a model of interaction between government policymakers and private investors, aimed at helping to explain why some countries are able to sustain policies that foster high levels of investment and rapid economic growth, while others remain at near-subsistence for long periods of time. This question is of particular urgency in Africa, where numerous countries have experienced a succession of harsh policy regimes that invite little investment and foster little productivity growth.
Persistent stagnation in Africa seems to be widespread but not inevitable: since independence at least a dozen African countries have adopted more favorable economic policies and experienced real income growth (Rodrik 1998), and variation in growth rates is greater in Africa than in any other region. 1 In this paper we use the variation in growth rates within Africa to ask, can African countries' economic performance be explained in terms of their governments' policy choices? And if so, can those choices be explained as rational policymakers' responses to observable conditions?
Many analyses of African policy-making explain the persistence of low-growth policies in terms of conflict among interest groups (Bates 1981) or across ethnic divisions (Easterly and Levine 1997) . But such explanations beg the question of why these conflicts are more readily resolved in some locations than in others. An alternative approach is to ask how material conditions might influence policy outcomes. Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2000) study how cross-country differences in biophysical conditions during the 18 th and 19 th century influenced national institutions, whose persistence helps explain subsequent economic growth. 2 In our model, biophysical conditions continue to influence policy choice in the present, through the equilibrium conditions of a repeated game between policy-makers (who impose taxes and make public investments) and the private sector (who produce for the market). This approach leads to specific policy implications concerning the technologies or institutions that sustain progrowth equilibria.
Our approach builds on analyses of time-consistency in pricing policies by McMillan (2000) , Besley (1997) , McLaren (1996) and Gilbert and Newbery (1994) , extending that earlier work to include public R&D, productivity change and economywide growth. We focus on African agriculture because it is a key sector in these economies, because its production technology is sensitive to local biophysical conditions and public 1 . Long-run growth rates for the 1965-95 period across African countries ranged from -2.3 to +5.7 percent, with a coefficient of variation of 2.7 percent. The next-highest variability was in East Asia and Latin America. See Appendix Table 1 for details. 2 Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) address the geographic pattern of growth in the Americas. They argue that factor endowments favored greater use of slave labor in some regions than in others, and that slavery's persistent legacy of political inequality retards growth. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2000) address growth across ex-colonies, arguing that settler mortality favored the establishment of more extractive colonial institutions in some regions than in others, whose persistent legacy of rent-seeking retards growth.
R&D investment, 3 and because it offers substantial variation in performance that we can capture in a consistent dataset to test the model. Appendices describe and present those data, which are available from the authors on request.
II. Theory
Our model focuses on two specific policy instruments -output taxation and investment in public goods -and treats economic growth as the equilibrium outcome of an infinitely-repeated game between government officials and the private sector. In specifying the model, we begin with farmers' investment and production choices, then address the government's options, and derive the conditions under which repeated interactions between optimizing farmers and optimizing policymakers result in persistent stagnation, and those which sustain high levels of investment and productivity growth.
Farmers
In the model, farmers choose between remaining at subsistence and producing for market, where they can earn positive profits but are exposed to taxation. The total cost of producing for market, c, varies across farmers continuously over [ 0, c max ] , representing variation in distance to market and/or agro-climatic conditions. These costs can be divided into sunk costs, s, and harvesting costs, h, which also vary continuously across farmers.
Each farmer chooses q t to maximize the present value of profits or,
where, δ t is the farmer's discount rate, P t f is the farmer's price received at the market, q t is the farmer's investment level (normalized, for example, to one unit of land), γ(rd t-1 ) is the productivity gain generated by investment in public R&D in the previous five-year period, determined by its productivity (γ) and the government's spending level (rd t-1 ), and c are total costs, where c=s+h.
Thus, in a competitive sector where subsistence yields zero profits, farmers plant as long as the farmgate price covers total costs.
The Government
The government cannot itself undertake production, perhaps because supervision costs would be prohibitive. But it does control the marketplace, and is the only provider of R&D. The government sets the tax wedge between the price paid to farmers, P f , and the price received from consumers which for simplicity (and realism, in a small-country setting) we assume to be an exogenous world price, P w . We assume that policymakers have an infinite time horizon, and seek to maximize the present discounted value of some social welfare function which is a weighted sum of tax revenue and producer surplus given by, 
Optimal policy
In pursuing its objective the government has two policy instruments, the farmgate price and spending on R&D. To constrain the policymaker's problem in a realistic way we rule out nondistorting lump-sum taxes, and require each year's spending on R&D to not exceed the government's tax revenues. Hence, the government's problem is the following, 
The first order condition with respect to rd t is:
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the government budget constraint. Interpreting, the optimal level of R&D spending equates the marginal benefit of additional R&D spending to the marginal cost of additional taxation. If the constraint is binding, then λ>0 and the distortions associated with raising government funds raise the marginal costs of R&D, requiring it to be more productive. The first order condition with respect to P f t is;
Rearranging terms and recognizing that (dQ t /Q t )/(dP f t /P f t ) is equal to the farmgate price elasticity of supply yields the following solution for the optimal farmgate price, Equation 8 implies that in the extreme case in which α=0 and policymakers place no value on producer surplus, the tax that maximizes their objective function is the [ ] 
Equilibrium policy
In the context of sunk costs and a delay in farmers' price response, the sustainability of the optimal policy depends on incentives to deviate from it. For example, a government whose value of α is less than unity may be tempted to announce low taxes to induce investment, then raise taxes after sunk costs are incurred to expropriate the resulting economic rent. Farmers may, with experience, learn to doubt the government's announcements, fearing to lose their sunk costs. Thus observed investment and tax levels will be part of a repeated game between policymakers and farmers, whose equilibrium depends on the incentives available in deviation (or defection) from the optimal (or cooperative) policy.
We assume that farmers have no recourse against expropriation other than to retreat from the market to subsistence farming for k periods. The length of k could be infinite, if subsistence production never generates enough surplus to support another experiment in market production, or it could be just one period. Given that expropriation of farmers' sunk costs would lead to k periods of no new investment, the government's net gain from expropriation is given by,
Equation (9) is derived assuming that the government must continue to pay some marginal harvesting cost, h, to some farmers for T periods in order to obtain the fruits of past investment and h t * is the solution to dW/dh. Hence the government saves on sunk costs and R&D. Implicitly, we assume crop rotation where some new planting occurs every year, and T represents the length of time over which the crop continues to produce without having to reinvest in sunk costs. This ranges from zero for crops that are
replanted every year such as cereals, to several years or decades for long-lived crops such as coffee and cocoa. Since k represents the number of periods for which output equals zero because no new planting takes place, after expropriation farmers begin to plant again in period T+k+1.
For government the value of not deviating from the optimal policy is given by,
and as long as (10) remains greater than (9) the optimal policy is sustainable.
Conditions for the time-consistency of optimal policy
Subtracting (9) from (10), and recalling from (1) that costs can be divided into harvest plus sunk costs, yields the following condition under which the optimal policy is a sustainable equilibrium:
The left-hand side of inequality (11) is the ratio of sunk costs to total costs, weighted by government's relative valuation of farm income as opposed to tax revenue. It thus represents the government's short-run gains available in defection away from the low-tax, high-growth path. The right hand side of inequality (11) is the present discounted value of the long-run costs of deviating from the high-growth path: once farmers' profits are expropriated by high taxation, they revert to subsistence farming for k periods and the government loses the present discounted value of the foregone tax revenue adjusted for productivity increases owing to continued spending on R&D.
Equation (11) provides the testable hypotheses of the model. The factor highlighted in our model that is generally omitted from other analyses is s * /P f* , the observed ratio of sunk to total costs. The higher is this sunk/total cost (STC) ratio, the greater is the government's incentive to undertake predatory taxation after investment occurs. The STC ratio is largely a physical characteristic of production technology, and is relatively high for perennials and production systems requiring a heavy up-front investment in irrigation or field preparation. African countries tend to have a comparative advantage in these products, particularly tree crops, perhaps because the African environment, like the tropics more generally, offers less of a concentrated summer growing season with less available moisture and generally poorer soils than temperate regions. By favoring crops requiring heavy preharvest investment, the physical
environment itself can be said to make farmers relatively more vulnerable to predatory taxation, thus inhibiting growth unless governments can commit to low-tax/high R&D policies.
Two other variables, α and β, formalize the role of political conditions that are often discussed in previous studies (e.g. Bates 1981 ): α reflects the degree to which the government is representative of farmers as opposed to those who benefit from tax revenue, and β reflects the degree to which the government is impatient and discounts future tax revenues. For example, Hall and Jones (1999) argue that poor policies could be due to the limited political accountability associated with nondemocratic traditions, as would be captured by the parameter α . Similarly, Easterly and Levine (1997) argue that African countries' poor policy choices may be due to their internal ethnolinguistic divisions and frequent political conflict, hence high discount rates as captured by parameter β.
The remaining two variables, expected future world prices and the productivity of R&D, may be thought to differ systematically between Africa and the rest of the world.
But recent projections of Africa's terms of trade (Hertel et al. 1998 ) suggest relatively high demand for African farm products, and studies of the productivity of African agricultural research suggest that it is at least as productive as research elsewhere (Masters et al., 1999 , Alston et al. 2000 .
Consequences of agricultural policy for economywide growth
The political-economy model described above provides testable predictions about which countries will adopt what policies. To generate predictions as to the consequences of those policies for the economy as a whole we need to control for other major determinants of growth. Following the conditional-convergence approach to empirical growth of Barro (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) , we assume that our agricultural sector is embedded in a Cobb-Douglas aggregate economy for which growth is a transitional process from its randomly determined initial income (y 0 ) to its steady-state potential income (y ss ) determined by resource endowments and their productivity, and the time path of income follows:
where b is the speed of convergence to the steady-state. In this context, growth will be faster for countries with lower levels of initial income or higher levels of steady-state income. Differentiating (12) with respect to time we obtain the following:
In the cross-country empirical implementation, we first ask whether policy choices are in fact correlated with material conditions as predicted by equation (11) -looking particularly for an effect of cross-country differences in the STC ratio when controlling for differences in other factors that influence policy. Then, we ask whether our measures of agricultural taxation and R&D investment are significant correlates of growth, raising the steady state income level in equation (13) controlling for its other possible determinants.
III. Empirical Application
Equation (11) is a condition for sustaining optimal policy. The model predicts that, if condition (11) is met, we will observe low taxes, high investment, and high rates of economic growth. If the condition is not met we expect to observe high taxes and low investment associated with the Nash equilibrium growth trap. Specifically, the model suggests that the low-tax, high-growth equilibrium will be harder to sustain: (a) the larger the share of sunk costs in total costs, (b) the smaller are expected future profits from a particular investment, (c) the greater the government's discount factor and, (d) the lower is expected future productivity of R&D spending. In deriving our estimating equations we will avoid needing to measure α, the weight on producer surplus, which we will treat as an unobservable variable taking on country-specific values.
To simplify notation, we rename each of the variables we are interested in testing. The sunk to total cost ratio is called STC. The government's discount factor is δ(T,k), where
). It is expressed as a function of T and k to remind us that its value will depend on the length of punishment, k and on the type of crop, T, as well as on the pure time-preference factor β. The expected future profit margin is PROF e . The expected productivity of R&D spending is R&D e . Rewriting equation (11) with the new variable names gives the following condition for sustaining the "high-growth" equilibrium,
Our empirical strategy is to construct a direct test of the model followed by a variety of alternative formulations and robustness tests. Taken literally, the model implies that countries make discrete jumps from one regime to the other. Thus the direct test requires us to classify countries in terms of whether the observed tax rate is higher than the optimal tax implied by equation (8). In the absence of information on α, we classify as high-tax only those governments whose tax rates exceed the revenue-maximizing tax, computed using long-run elasticities following McMillan (2000) . This is the highest tax that any government might consider optimal, as a lower rate would increase revenues for both government and producers.
This model-based classification of tax regime differs substantially from the prespecified cutoffs used in other studies to differentiate between favorable and unfavorable policy environments, such as the 30 percent tax rate used by Jaeger (1992). We also classify countries into low-and high-growth regimes, based on whether per-capita growth rates were negative or positive.
Using the regime classifications we conduct a direct test of the model, asking whether the variables in inequality (14) are statistically relevant predictors of regime type in a probit specification. The advantage of taking the model literally in this way is that, if it were the true model, these parameter estimates would be precise. But we also wish to test the robustness of our observed correlations to alternative model specifications. In particular, we would like to use the tax and growth variables in a continuous OLS specification, to retain any information implicit in the magnitude of these variables, and to ensure that our results are directly comparable to others' work in the empirical-growth literature. The relevant estimating equations are derived below, first for the limited-dependent-variable probit specification and then for the linear OLS regression.
The limited dependent variable model
Up to this point, we have ignored α, the government's weight on producer surplus.
We expect it to vary from country to country so we give it a subscript, α i . The net benefit of a low-tax policy, y i * , depends on this unobserved variable,
What we observe is only which policy regime prevails, corresponding to the sign of (15) Thus, the probability that a low-tax/high-growth regime prevails is,
Estimating this equation requires an assumption about the distribution of 1-α i. Recall that the unobserved variable, α i , is the weight that the government places on producer surplus relative to its own. Hence, it lies between negative infinity and one and is likely to be grouped between zero and one. It is reasonable to assume that the distribution of 1-α i is log normal with mean µ and variance σ 2 . Hence,
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation one, and µ and σ account for the fact that log(1-α i ) may have a normal distribution with a mean other than zero and variance not equal to one. Rewriting equation (18) in log-linear form yields the following estimating equation 5 :
Linear models
For OLS estimation we use inequality (14) informally, as a guide to the variables that might be important in determining policy levels rather than regime type. Here our dependent variables are the original continuous measures of taxation and spending on research and development in agriculture. Specifically, we estimate the following two equations: , and are available for a total of 56 crops and 32 countries for various years. For the cross-country regressions, the crop specific variables (eg tax rates and ratios of sunk to total costs) are aggregated up to national levels using production weights. All of these variables are computed annually, then averaged up to four subperiods, 1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84 and 1985-89 to take account of variation in world 5 Note that two testable restrictions on these coefficients, namely γ 0 = 0 and γ 1 = γ 2 = -γ 3 are implied by the model but rejected in it is empirical application with the available data. commodity prices and economic conditions. 6 Statistical tests are performed both for the individual sub-periods and then for the pooled data.
VI. Results
Tables 1 and 2 reports estimation of equation (19) (2000) and then testing the major variables for political conditions reported in the Barro-Lee data set.
The signs of the estimated coefficients on all explanatory variables are as predicted by our model in all regressions, although the political variables are statistically significant in only three of the eight regressions. In the tax-regime regressions of Table 1 , the STC ratio is by far the most strongly significant regressor; in the growth-regime regressions of Table 2 , it is the net profitability variable. From Table 1 , countries whose production systems require higher levels of sunk costs are more likely to have confiscatory agricultural tax regimes, and also to not grow -this is consistent with the model, as it is the taxation of these sunk costs which might tempt the government into deviation from the optimal policy. From Table 2 , countries whose agricultural production is very profitable are particularly likely to experience growth, and also to have low tax regimes. Again this is consistent with the model, as it is the pursuit of these expected profits that induces the government to sustain the optimal policy. Tables 3 and 4 report regression results for equations (20a) and (20b) respectively.
The signs of the estimated coefficients are again as expected, and here the political variables are significant in five of the eight regressions. Although there is a much smaller sample size for regressions explaining R&D, significance levels are similar for the two dependent variables. In this context the magnitudes of the coefficients can be interpreted directly, and the importance of the STC ratio is clearly visible in the results. Table 5 reports results for growth rates in a comparable way, revealing that a ten percent higher STC ratio is associated with a one percent lower growth rate.
Tables 6 and 7 report regressions estimating equation (21), using a cross section of the long-run data and then a panel of the five-year averages. The first column of both tables establishes the correlation between growth rates and our two agricultural policy instruments (taxation and R&D) plus their interaction. In both cases the predicted correlations are strong and significant. The Table 6 formulation permits us to include controls for three economywide policy measures that have achieved prominence in the empirical-growth literature: aggregate government savings as a measure of fiscal prudence, the openness of policy to foreign trade as a measure of rent-seeking and distortions in the external sector, and the quality of institutions as a measure of rent-seeking and distortions in the domestic sector. None of these controls has much influence on the results. Adjusted R-square values are high and unchanged, and coefficients are uniformly large and significantly different from zero-except for the taxation variable when controlling for the external openness, which may be due to similarities in the types of policies these two variables pick up. In any case, R&D levels remain a highly significant correlate of growth and long-run productivity, confirming the association between R&D and economywide growth in this context. Table 7 provides the same regressions using panel data, allowing controls for unobservable influences on growth rates in particular countries or time periods. Column (1) gives results without controls for any such fixed effects. Column (2) allows for period-specific fixed effects, column (3) checks for both period-and country fixed effects, and column (4) drops the initial-income variable which, as a lagged value of the dependent variable could bias the panel results. As before the correlations between R&D and taxation with growth are highly robust to these controls. Results for each variable are similar to those using the long-run growth data in Table 6 , although model R-square values are lower due to the presence of business cycles, terms of trade shocks, weather disturbances and other noise.
Finally, to provide results that are fully comparable to many other studies and provide a different sort of robustness test, Table 8 presents regressions that use our agricultural-policy measures as controls in a standard growth-accounting context. The first column of Table 8 takes the growth-accounting specification identified as empirically important on a worldwide basis by Sachs and Warner (1997) , and replicates it for our within-Africa sample. Columns 2 and 3 do the same, discarding the variables that lose their significance in this context, for both the restricted Sachs-Warner sample and the larger sample for which the data are available.
Columns 3a, 3b and 3c then add three alternative measures of taxation, and columns 3a', 3b' and 3c' do so with the R&D variable as well. Results are consistent across all three taxation measures: Columns 3a and 3a' use the dummy variable constructed by Deaton and Miller (1995) to indicate whether a country paid producers a relatively high proportion of the world price during the period 1970-1975, constructed using a weighted average of the country's most important exports. Columns 3b and 3b' use a similar dummy constructed by McMillan (2000) covering the period 1970-1979. Columns 3c and 3c' use the same continuous measure as in the previous tables, namely the average nominal protection coefficient, or ratio of domestic producer price to world price. Once again the R&D variable overshadows tax policy as a correlate of growth. This may be because its effect is stronger, but it could also be due to other factors such as having less measurement error than the tax variable.
IV. Conclusions
This paper presents and tests a model of policy choice aimed at explaining why so many (but not all) African governments adopt self-defeating predatory policies towards the private sector, when pro-growth reforms would yield greater incomes for both government and the private sector.
The theory is a political-economy model in which the government sets the level of taxation and R&D in a strategic game with domestic producers who produce output. One equilibrium has the government commit to low taxes with investment in R&D, so as to elicit high and growing levels of production. Another possible equilibrium involves high tax rates and no investment, to which the economy responds with low and stagnant levels of production and perhaps a retreat to subsistence.
Without an institutional mechanism for commitment to a particular strategy, the government can credibly be expected by farmers to sustain high-growth policies only if material conditions make it consistently in government's favor to do so. This requires that the sector's share of sunk costs in total costs be relatively small (yielding a low potential payoff to exploitation by a rent-seeking government), the government's discount rate be relatively low (leading to a high value on the future costs of exploitation in the present), high expected future profitability and high relative weight on farmers' as opposed to government's own income.
Empirical tests of these hypotheses find considerable support for the model, particularly for the relevance of the sunk-to-total-cost ratio in determining policy choice.
Our conclusion is that one factor contributing to African economic performance could be that African policy-makers are trapped in a low-growth equilibrium of opportunistic policies and low investment, induced by high levels of sunk costs in the production system.
Changes in technology or institutions that enable producers to escape taxation or retaliate against it, as well as changes enabling governments to make credible pro-growth commitments, are thus likely to have a high payoff in promoting a more favorable policy environment.
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Initial income
Log of real GDP per economically active person in 1965, from Sachs and Warner (1997), using GDP from Penn World Tables 5.6 and economically active population (defined as the population between the ages of 15-64) from the World Bank (1995).
Agricultural R&D
Log of average annual real R&D expenditure per capita in agriculture, from Pardey, Alston and Roseboom (1998) . R&D expenditures include spending on personnel, operating expenses and capital expenditures in research and development for crops, livestock, forestry and fisheries, by public and semi-public agencies.
Agricultural taxation
Data on taxation of export crops in Sub-Saharan Africa were obtained from Jaeger for data through 1987, and updated to 1995 for the World Bank (Jaeger 1991 , McMillan 2000 .
Jaeger uses the same methodology to estimate nominal protection coefficients (NPCs) used in Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988,1983) and recommended by Westlake (1987) . And, where the country crop combinations are the same, Jaeger's estimates are practically identical to those reported in Krueger et al (1988 Krueger et al ( ,1993 . All three of these studies point to the importance of properly adjusting international reference prices to reflect value-added and transport costs.
Previous studies often looked only at the ratio of the farmgate price to the world price without accounting for processing and transport costs and hence grossly overestimated the rates of taxation. A better estimate of the level of taxation is the ratio of the farmgate price to the border price adjusted for transport and processing costs and is a measure of the divergence between what farmers could get if they sold their product directly to world markets and what they actually get due to government intervention. The tax rate is then one minus the NPC.
Calculation of the nominal protection coefficient requires data on prices paid to farmers, world prices, and an estimate of any value added to the crop between the time of pickup from farmers and export. Several sources including the Food and Agricultural
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Bank now publishes data on prices paid to farmers and world prices. However, to estimate the true nominal protection coefficient, one must convert these farmgate prices into their equivalent in terms of the processed good and adjust the world price for transport and marketing costs.
For example, in 1986 farmers in Madagascar received the equivalent of $0.89/kg. of dry robusta coffee cherries. The world price for roasted robusta coffee beans was $2.57/kg.
Since 1 kg. of roasted coffee equals approximately 1.32 kgs. of dry cherries and because the world price is for dry cherries, first the farmgate price is converted to its international equivalent by multiplying .89 by 1.32 to get $1.17 per kg. We now adjust the world price for transport and processing charges by subtracting .27 per kg. and .10 per kg. to get $2.20 per kg.
Hence, the NPC is 0.53 and the corresponding tax rate is 47%. Details of the conversion factors, transport costs, processing margins, and freight charges used by Jaeger are published in McMillan 2000.
Government Savings
Average central government surplus or deficit as a percent of GDP, 1970-90, as used by Sachs and Warner (1997) from World Bank (1995) .
Openness (Sachs-Warner index)
The fraction of years during the period 1965-90 in which the country meets all of the following criteria: (a) nontariff barriers apply to less than 40 percent of trade, (b) average tariffs are less than 40 percent, (c) the black market foreign exchange premium was less than 20 percent, (d) the country is not classified as socialist and (e) major exports are not subject to monopoly trading, from Sachs and Warner (1997).
Institutional Quality (ICRG index)
Average rating for the rule of law, the quality of bureaucracy, the prevalence of government corruption, the risk of expropriation, and the repudiation of contracts by government. This index was used by Sachs and Warner (1997) and originally constructed by the Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS) from data printed in the International Country Risk Guide published by Political Risk Services.
Sunk-to-Total-Cost ratio
Computed from cost-of-production estimates for various crop years, as one minus the ratio of harvest cost to total cost from data and sources in McMillan (2000) , appendix A.
Net profitability
Computed from data reported in McMillan (2000) , and follows the recommendation of Deaton and Miller (1995) by estimating the expected future profit margin by taking an average of actual profits over the twenty-year period, 1970-1989.
Imputed discount rate
Defined as
), where β is one minus one over the mean time in power for each country since the time of independence at each point in time, or the retrospective hazard rate for the probability that the present government will remain in power.
For example, when Jerry Rawlings came to power in Ghana in 1981, the mean time in office for his predecessors was 3.14 years, so the probability that he would remain in power the following year was 31.45 percent. The imputed discount rate for government policy is this political discount rate, β, plus the time value of money at five percent per year.
Revenue Maximizing Tax Rates
Computed as one over one plus the elasticity of supply, the tax rate that maximizes total revenue. Elasticities of supply were obtained for each crop from a number of sources and are reported in McMillan (2000) .
Political instability
Average over 1960-90 of the five-year averages reported by Barro and Lee.
Frequency of revolutions
Political rights
Average over 1960-90 of the five-year averages reported by Barro and Lee. Table 8 (all from Sachs and Warner 1997)
Variables used only in

Life Expectancy
Life expectancy at birth.
Primary
Primary-school enrollment rates.
Demography
Average annual growth of economically active population, minus average annual growth in the total population, for 1965-90.
Tropics
Fraction of land area subject to tropical climate
Access
Dummy variable set to 1 for landlocked countries.
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